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After the first sentence of this paragraph,  please add the following: 
These rules will apply only to nev investments end existing investments 
conforming to the laws  of the host country,  being an  independent and 
souvereign stat e;  they will not be substitutes for bilateral agreements, 
but will complete them. Int r·oductory  Note 
This  document  represents  an  initial  Community  approach  to  encouraging 
European  investments  in  the  developing  countries. 
The  use of the  Community  dimension  for  the  encouragement  of  investments 
is proposed  by  the  Commission  for  three purposes  : 
- to  assist  the  economic  development  of  the developing  countries, 
- to promote  the  interests of  the  Community  and  its  economy, 
- to  contribute  to  the  harmonious  development  of  the  world  economy. 
The  proposed  system  is  based en  general  agreements  completing  the net-
work  of  national  protection  agreements  to  be  concluded  between  develop-
ing  countries  and  the  Community  as  a  whole,  and  on  measures  to  promote 
selectively  investments  of pnrticular  interest  to the  Community  and  in 
the  host  countries on  a  project  by project  basis. A.  BACKGROUND 
In  the  matter  of  European  investment  in  the  developing  countries,  there 
is  as  a  rule  a  convergence of  interests  between  : 
- the  developing  countries,  which,  in  order  to  supplement  their  own 
factors  of  productior~, are  dependent  on  imported  capital,  technical 
knowhow  and  management  _capadt)'  (these three  items  being  combined  ir: 
~uropean  investment  operations) ; 
firms,  which  are  seeking  the  best  possible  locations  in  terms  of  pro-
duction  costs,  raw  ma-::erials  and  energy  supplies  and  market  access; 
-the industrialised  countries,  which  are  keen  to  see  intergovernmental 
cooperation  and  in particular official  assistance  backed  up  by  the 
private  sector, whose contribution can also act as a valuable stabilizing 
factor  in  economic  relations  with  the developing  countries. 
We  are,  however,  witnessing  real  blockages  in  this field.  Developing 
countries  sometimes  resort  to  measures  which  are  considered  by  investors 
as  incompatible  with  the  exercise of their  business  activities.  On  the 
other  hand,  investors  do  not  always  show  sufficient  understanding  for  the 
concerns  of  the  host  countries.  At  any  rate,  investors  tend to  consider  as 
high  the  non-commercial  risks  that  they  run  in  directing  their  activities 
towards  the  developing  countries. 
When  a  considerable  number  of  developing  countries  became  independent 
approximately  25  years  ago,  the  fears  felt  about  investment  conditions 
in  those  countries  were  essentially  restricted to  the  direct  risks  of 
expropriation or  serious public disorder.  Since then,  the  problems  have 
become  more  varied  and  more  diffuse.  Now  they  consist  mainly  of  creeping 
expropriation  measures  such  as  the gradual  erosion of  exploitation 
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conditions,  imposition of  additional  charges,  obstacles to  a  freely-
determined  export  policy  and  interference  in  management.  In  so  far  as 
investors  are prepared to  enter  into precise obligations  towards  the 
host  countries  and  in  particular to  integrate their activities  in  the 
development  policies of  those  countries,  they  demand  protection from 
such  risks  as  a prior  condition  for  any  investment. 
The  problem  of  the  investment  climate  in  the  developing  countries  and 
its repercussions  on  investors'  decisions  has  certainly  had  an  influence 
on  private  investment  flows  from  the  Community  to  the  developing  coun-
tries, which  have  been  stagnating  since  1972  and  are  even  threatening  to 
decline dramatically  in  certain  sectors,  as  will  be  shown  below.  This 
trend  is  increasingly disturbing  since it  is  Likely  in  the  Long  run  to 
harm  the  economic  and  political  interests of  both  the  Community  and  the 
developing  countries. 
The  Community  has  a  vital  interest  in  seeing  its network  of  inve~tments 
in  the  developing  countries expand  at  the  same  rate  as  those of  its  com-
petitors  in  trade, particularly the  United  States and  Japan.  It  is there-
fore  essential that  a  large  number  of  major  investments  be  made  in  the 
various  sectors of  the  developing  countries'  economics  in  order  to 
- maintain  and  strengthen  the presence of  European  industry  and  trade 
on  the  markets  of  the  developing  countrie~ in  the  face  of  international 
competition  ; 
- provide  a  durable  and  expanding  base  for  trade  between  industrialized 
and  developing  countries  ; 
- provide the Community  with  more  secure  and  diverse:· supplies of raN 
materials,  etc. 
It  is also  important  during  the present  period of  world  economic  crisis 
to  sustain external  demand  by  increasing  financial  flows  for  the  most 
promising  earmarked  activities  in  the  Third  World- a  subject  that  will 
be  taken  up  ·again  in  Commission  Cornmunicatiotls.  An  incre3sc·  in  Lwestment 
flows  would  have  a  direct  and  beneficial  effect  on  ex+ernal.  rl.em~.1d  for  the 
products of the  Community's  capital  goods  industr·!es  and  for  go'·  ..  ~s to 
service  investment  operations. 
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From  the  viewpoint  of  the  developing  countries,..  particuLarLy  tnos~::  ;.Jitr' 
close  economic  reLations  with  the  Community,  the  stagnation  o~  Commun1ty 
investment  threatens  to  have  a  serious  effec~ on  economic  development  and 
on  ~ndustrialization in  particuLar.  In  addi~ion tc  the  repercussionf  o~ 
their  ex:ernal  e~rningsF  which  they  need  in  order  to  be  able  do  develor 
their  economie~~  in  the  long  run  such  a  trend  would  seriously affect their 
technological  and  scientific  develooment  and  their  capacity  for  managing 
the  modern  sectors  of  their  economies. 
The  Commission  is particularly  preo::cupied  by  the  situatior-•  in  the  mining 
sector.  In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  disturbine  dec~ine  in  Europea~ 
companies'  mining  and  exploration  activities  in  the  Third  World.  Ir  1951 
expenditure  on  ex~loration  in  these  countries  represented  57%  of  Eurooean 
companies'  expenditure  on  exploration  in  the  world  whereas  in  the  ceriod 
1973-75  this proportion  had  fallen  to  13,5  %. 
This  tendency  t~early represents  in  the  more  or  less  long  ter~, r  serious 
danger  to  mineral  supplies  for  the  Community•s  manufacturing  and  trans-
forming  industries  as  well  as  for  the  world  markets  for  many  mineral  pro-
ducts  with  all  the  negative  economic  results  which  would  follow. 
f=rc,,;  the  geological  point  of  view  however,..  the  bulf-:  of  exploration  should 
b  k .  l  •  h  '  L  .  .  ( 1)  M  '  f  e  ta  1ng  p  ace  1n  t  e  aeve  op1ng  countr1es  •  oreover  1n  terms  o 
necessity  of  supplies,  it  is obvious  that  the  industrialized  countries  to 
\·Jhi ch  invest  mer<  resources  are  currentLy  flowing  cannot  constitute  a 
solution  in  the  medium  term  because they  will  consume  a  growing  proportion 
of their  own  mineral  production. 
The  main  reason  for  the  stagnation of  investment  in this  field  is the 
difficulty  faced  by  the  mining  companies,  but  particularly  by  the  banks 
which  fiGance  them,  in  taking  on  the  considerable  medium  and  Long  term 
financing  commitments  involved  in  startin£  up  production  as  long  as  they 
feel  that,  in  many  Third  World  countries,  they  run  non-commercial  risks 
to  which  they  feel  they  should  not  be  exposed. 
• I • 
(1)  For  five  essential  minerals  (cabal:, tin, pnosphates,  tungsten  and 
copper),  it  has  been  estimated  that  betwee~  half  and  almost  all  free 
world  supplies  will  have  to  be  provided  by  the  developing  countries 
in  1985. - 4  -
This  is the  reason  why  precise requests  for  Community  action  to  encourage 
investment  in  the  developing  countries  have  been  addressed  to  the  Commis-
sion by  a  European  consortium of  mining  companies. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  all  the parties  concerned  stand to  benefit  from 
the  removal  of these blockages  and  the  establishment  of  an  appropriate 
framework  to encourage,  facilitate  and  provide  security  for  investment 
in  the  developing  countries  in  both mining  and  other  sectors  and  ensure 
the  harmonious  integration of that  investment  in  the  developing  policy 
of the  host  country  and  in  the policies of  the  Community. 
B.  NEED  FOR  A COMMUNITY  APPROACH 
In  nearly all the  Community  countries, there  are  procedures  and  mechanisms 
d~signed to prOtect, guarantee,  and  sometimes  even  promote  nat~onal invest-
ments  abroad,  including  investments  in  developing  countries.  These  national 
systems,  whose  scope  varies  widely( 1), arenot  regarded  as  adequate  by  the 
firms  concerned.  In  many  cases,  it  is  considered that  the  cover  is too 
narrow.  There  is very  little cover  for  multinational  operations,  and  yet 
it  is often  highly  desirable  that  investors of different  nationalities 
should.unite their efforts and  share  the risks. 
Various  attempts have  been  made  to  find  solutions on  a  world  scale to  the 
problem of the  security of  investments,  but  they  have  not  succeeded.  There 
are  many  reasons  for  this, mostly  arising  from  the  variety of  situations 
and  doctrines - for  example,  the  determination of  the Latin  American 
countries not  to  accept  international  arbitration. 
The  CIEC  showed  that  the  limits to  a  worl.dwide  approach  may  be  reached 
very  quickly,  even  before  a start  can  be  made  en  tie operatio"a€ stage  • 
• J. 
(1)  Only  some  ten  developinG  countri·-?S  have  signed protec.tioo  t:~f11'e4':rtEnb 
with  a  number  of  Member  Stares.  The  Federql  Republic  of Germany  is 
the only  member  country lvicf:  a  satisfatt"ory  number  of  .::greell'!Qf\ts. 
Guarantee  mechanism~ vary  ;,.  intensity  fr·om  one  Community  membtH' 
countr;t  to  another  ;  only one  of  the l\1ember  sta~es uses  ffieM  to  :my 
significant  extent.  Three  Member  States  are  still without  ~guarantee 
system. - 5  -
However  in  the  Paris  Conference  significant progress  was  made  as  regards 
recognition of  the  value  of  foreign  investment  for  development  and  the 
desirability of a  good  secure  investment  clima~e  in  developing  countrie~. 
Since  national  measures  are  necessarily  incomplete,  and  since there  are 
no  satisfactory facilities  at  world  level,  the  Community  seems  to  offer 
the  right  dimension  for  action  to  promote  investment  in  the  developing 
countries.  Community  measures  would  not  repLace  ac:ion  by  the  Member 
States  but  would  be  a  useful  supplement,  especiaLly  for  extendin; 
ccntr~ctual  Links  between  member  countries  and  developing  countr1es  where 
investment  is  ooncerned,  and  for  limiting  non-commerciaL  risks  for 
certain  investmen:s  considered vita( for  the  Community  and  its partners. 
Community  measJres  in  this  field  would  supplement  the  development  co-
operation  measures  taken  by  the  Community  (Lorn~, Mediterranean  agreements, 
trade  cooperat1on  agreements,  etc.) and  increase their impact. 
In  addition,  the  European  Community,  which  is  not  pursuing  any  policy of 
domination,  and  which  comprises  nine  countries  with  a  wide  range  of 
sympathies,  WOtlld  be  in  a  better position than  any  of  its Member  States 
to  make  itself  heard  whenever  difficulties arose. 
C.  THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  COMMUNITY  ACTION 
The  proposition  the  Commission  envisages  two  categories of  action  : 
- the  first  one  involves  the negotiation  of  agreements  Cor  of  clauses 
to  be  'nctuded  in  global  agreements)  between  the  Community  and  develop-
ing  countries or groups  of  devetoping  countries on  basic  rules  relating 
to  the  t!"'eatrnent  of  fore,ign  investment. 
- The  seconJ involves  specific projects- selected because  of their 
particul~r  interest  - and  envisages  the  conclusion of specific 
protection  agreements  on  a  project  by  proj"ec;t  basis,  the granting 
of  guarantees  3nd  measures  to promote  investM~nts. 
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1.  Basic  rules on  investment 2rotection 
Bilateral  agreements  already  exist  between  Community  Member  States 
and  developing  countries  which  give  investment  protection  and  Lay 
down  - more  a  less precisely - impartial  and  equitable means  of 
settling disputes. 
At  the  multilateral  Level  several  attempts  to establish a  code  or 
convention on  the  protection of  foreign  property  have  failed  :  success 
has  been  achieved only  as  regards  arbitration  ;  the  International 
Centre  for  Settlement  of  Investment  Disputes  (ICSID)  was  set  up  in  1966 
to  provide  machinery  for  settling disputes  between  governments  and 
foreign  investors.  However,  the  fact  that  very  few  cases  have  been 
submitted  to  the  Centre  for  a  ruling  shows  its  limitations  although 
it  maybe  that  current  initiatives to extend  its scope  of operation 
will  improve  the situation. 
At  the  regional  Level  of  the  Euro-Arab  Dialogue  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Arabs  have  put  forward  proposals  which  offer  the possibility of  a 
genuine  solution to  the problem  of  investment  protection. 
It  is  Logical  furthermore,  that  the  European  Community,which  has  co-
operation  agreements,  many  of  them  bold  and  original,  with  numerous 
developing  countries,  should  wish  to  include  clauses  relating  to  invest-
ment  protection  which  would  improve  the possibilities  for  investment 
cooperation  in  the  interest of  both  the  developing  countries  concerned 
and  the Community. 
The  Commission  therefore proposes that,  in  future,  every  favourable 
investment  opportunity  should  be  taken  to  conclude  agreements  on  basic 
rules between  the  Community  and  one  or  more  developing  countries.  These 
rules  will  fix  the  norms  of good  conduct  of  the parties  concerned - host 
countries  and  investors - in  the  following  areas  :  transparency  and 
stability of  investment  conditions,  non-discriminatory  treatment  of 
inve·stment,  possibility of trans·fer  of  income  and  capitQ-€'1  ·tair  and 
equitable treatment  of the  investors property,  behaviour  of  investors 
-(e.g.  compliance  Hith the host  country's  favm,  inser~~:i.on in i.t-5 
development  prograAT~.:ne)  and procedures  for  sct·tlcmen-~ of disputbs. 
A clause  would  also be  inc'luded providing for  the possibility of sp8cific 
protection agreements  on  a  case-by-cuse basis vrl1ich  are discussed  below. - 7  -
Whenever  the  Community  and  a  developing  country  Cor  group  of  deveLoping 
countries)  have  a  cooperation  agreement  comprising  other  provisions  in 
favour  of  the  contracting  parties clauses  relating  to  investment  should 
be  incorporated  into  the  cooperation  agreement  itself.  Accordingly,  the 
Commission  intends  to  propose to  the  Council  that this  should  form  part 
·.-:_ -'::'--:  sot:.  -Li;.ern  r.~'2cli terranean countries,  and  otter coopcre.t ion  agrcemE:nts. 
Where  there  is  no  trade or  cooperation  agreement,  the  agreement  on  invest-
ment  protection  will  be  an  independent  instrument  ;  however,  ~:  may  include 
clauses  for  cooperation  between  firms  concernd  anc  the  developing  country 
in  question.  It  may  also  be  appropriate  to provide  for  a  forum  for  discussion 
in  such  agreements,  so  that  each  of the  contracting  parties  can  air  any 
problems  it encounters. 
2.  Measures  for  specific projects 
Although  agreement  on  basic  investment  rules  will  help  to  improve  the 
security of all  investements,  the  Commission  believes that  in  certain  areas 
of particular  interest,  such  as,  initially,  the  mining sector 
(see  pages  3  and  4  above)  further  measures  are  necessary  in  order  to  stimul-
ate  investment  and  guarantee  more  effectively the  interests of  the  Community 
and  the  host  country. 
For  this purpose  three  instruments  should  be  used  to  stimulate  new  ventures 
on  a  project  by  project  basis 
- specific project  agreements  agreements  between  the  developing  host 
country,  investing  firm  and  Community  authorities on  the precise terms 
and  conditions  governing  a  given project, 
guarantee  :  insurance offered  by  the  Community  to  cover  investments  in 
developing  countries  again~ non-commercial  risks  ;  this guarantee 
linked to  the  conclusion of  specific project  agreements; 
- promotion  :  financial  contributions  from  the  Community  and  other  inter-
national  o~ganisatioris to  selected  investment  projectse 
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a.  Specific  projcc~_  agreements 
The  second  instrument of Community-inspired  investment  protection is something 
of an innovation - specific agreements  to be  negotiated \'rith the host  countr;r 
concerned  by the  selected project. 
The  Community  •·wuld  be  a  party to these a.greements together •·Ji th the host 
country and  "the  investor·.  The  a.greeme:1ts  'irou.ld  relate to the:  precise 
terms and  conditions applying to the  individual  projects and  stipulate 
the  rights and ohtigations cf the  investor and.  host  coun-try  i!'l  the same 
>·IE>-Jl  as  co:nventions  of e::;;tablizh;;;ent  bstwcen  t~ese tw~ parties. 
Since the  Co~~unity would  be  a  party to the specific agreement  the  investor 
would  be assured of the  involvement  of the  Community authorities in the 
case of a  dispute resulting from  a  unilateral modification of these terms 
and  conditions. 
i·lhere  basic  investment  rules are  operative the specific agreement  would 
refer to them.  In other cases  the specific agreements would  include 
clauses relating to these basic rules.(1) 
The  specific agreements  would  cover the obligations and modalities of 
consultation between the three signatory parties on the  conditions of 
distribution of the product  of the investment. 
Specific agreements would also  include precise modalities to be  followed 
in cases of renegotiation,  disputes and  expropriation,  and  rules  on· 
arbitration procedures. 
In principle projects eligible  for the conclusion of a  specific protection 
agreement  should: 
conform to the criteria of priority fixed  by the  Community  (e.g. mining 
sector) 
be undertaken by  firms  from  at least two  member  states, 
involve a  large capital  (say investments of ¢50  rn  or more). 
(1)  In this respect the specific project approach wou.ld  lend itself inter 
alia to Latin American  cou:ntries which,  so  far,  have always  refused 
to conclude  genera.l  investment  protection agreements. - 9  -
b.  Community  guarantee 
The  protective effect  of  specific  agreements  would  be  reinforced  if the 
Community  could offer  the  investor  a  guarantee  against  non-commercial  risks. 
Such  a  guarantee  would  provide  for  compensation of  the  investor  for  Losses 
which  he  could  incur  in  spite of the political  and  Legal  security  which 
preventive  agreements  would  give. 
The  existing guarantee  mechanisms  in  most  of the  Member  States  help  to 
encourage  investment  abroad by  European  companies  and  there  is  no  question 
of  reducing  their  importance or  affecting  their operation. 
These  national  mechanisms  however  appear  to  be  inadequate  notably  where  very 
Large  investments  involving  substantial  risks  need  to  be  covered  and  parti-
cularly  in  the  case of projects  undertaken  jointly by  investors  from  several 
Member  States. 
In  this  Latter  case  an  investment  project  can  be  dropped  because of  the 
absence  of  a  national  insurance  system,  the  exclusion  certain sectors, 
the  inadequacy of  insurance  ceilings, the  rigidity of  conditions,  a  diver-
ging  appreciation of  the  risk  or  the  interest  which  a  venture  represents 
for  the  national  economy. 
At  the  international  level,  the  impossibility of  reaching  agreement  on  a 
guarantee  for  foreign  investment  is as  clear  as  in  the  case  of protection 
agreements,  as  the  failure  of the  IBRD's  1972  proposition to  create  an 
"International  Investment  Insurance  Agency"  CiliA)  has  shown. 
For  all  these  reasons,  it  is  important  to  find  a  Community  solution for 
investments  which  cannot  be  covered  satisfactory through  national  guarantee 
agencies. 
The  approach  involving  a  direct,  structured  cooperation  between  national 
investment  guarantee  agencies,  in other  words  joint  insurance  together 
with  a  mechanism  for  concertation  and  decision,  would  have  Little  chance 
of  success given  the  divergent  practices  in the different  Member  States  • 
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The  Commission  therefore proposes that  a  guarantee  should be  instituted 
at  Community  level. 
The  operation of  the guarantee  would  be  linked to the exist-
ence  of a  specific agreement  of the  kind  described  in  the preceding 
chapter.  The  guarantee  would  result  from  a  bilateral  contract  between 
the  Community  and  investor,  concluded  at  the  request  of the  Latter.  It 
would  cover  war  risks,  restrictions on  free  transfer, expropriation  and 
any  other unilateral modification of the dispositions  defined  in  the 
specific agreement,  whicht  affect  the viability of the  investment. 
As  at  the national  leveL  firms  wishing  to  have  recourse to  the guarantee 
will  be  asked  to  pay  a  premium.  The  rates of  the  premium  could  either  be 
adjusted to  take  account  of the  risk  represented  by  the  individual  project 
or  be  based  on  the  average  of all the  risks to  be  carried  by  the  system 
in general  or  for  a particular sector.  This  question  as  well  as  those 
relating  to other  technical  modalities of the  system  (extent· of  cover  of 
the  capital  and  profits,  cover  in  case of  loss etc.)  should  be  agreed, 
as  should  anY  cooperation arrangements to be 'worked  out  ~ith the private 
insurance  sector. 
The  receipts  from  the premiums  paid  by  the  assured  should  normally  ensure 
the  financial  autonomy  of  the guarantee  mechanism,  given  that  the obligatory 
existence of the preventive  instruments  mentioned  above  will  limit  the  risks 
considerably.  In  the  case  of receipts being  insufficient  to  cover  expenditure 
resulting  from  payment  of  compensation  for  tosses,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
have  recourse to the  Community  budget,  in  line  with modalities to  be  fixed 
and  proportions  to  be  defined •. In  the  case  of  payment  of  compensation  to 
the  investor  the  Community  would  be  subrogated  into all its rights  with 
respect  to  the  host  government. 
The  Community  guarantee  will  necessitate the  establishment  of  a  management 
· tt  ·  ·  d up  f  ·  f  h  C  ·  ·  comm1  ee  or guarantee  comm1ss1on  rna  e  o  representet1ves o  t  e  omm1ss1on 
and  Member  States to  examine  requests  for  cover. 
.1. - 11  -
The  Commission  lopked at this problem  five years ago  (1)  and its position 
has  changed  in the  interim.  Now  its approach  only  covers the developing 
cou."1tries  where  the need  for measures to encourage  investment  is most 
felt.  Also  the  Commission  now  sees the  question of investment  guarantees 
in  a  wider  context  bringing in the protection and  promotion  aspects. 
~>.J.::;;"!;ly  it had  proposed  the  creation  of  a  Community  guarantee  agency. 
~lOiv  feels that  a  much  lighter frame•-<ork  -vrould  be  sui  table  and that 
Cc.mwunity  guarantees  should  be  administered by existing national agencies 
ir.  the  Comrn<.mity,  Hithin the  context  of the regulations  and  safeguards 
~dopted at  Community  level.  These national agencies would  be  paid  for 
their services,  their remuneration being' included in the  costs of the 
system. 
c.  Promotion 
:2~nancial contributions from  official sources  would act  as an  element  of 
investment  promotion additional to the  effect  of the  agreements and  the 
gua::.~antee  mechani srn. 
T::;.lks  >vi th  investors  show that  in the  eyes of  company  managers,  this aspect 
of  support  for European  investments in developing countries is significant 
in that it improves protection,  and  makes  guarantees  less necessary:  direct 
ir.tervention  in the  form  of international financing implicates the  organization 
concerned  should the  investment  be  threatened. 
In this -vray  even  a  small  contribution can be  helpful  in reducing non-
COliilllercial  risks. 
( 1)Proposal  for  a  CoQ~cil regulation establishing a  system of  Co~~unity 
guarantees for private  investments  in non-member  countries C0f.l(72) 
1461  of  20  December  1972. - 12-
From  the  financing  angle,  it  is  desirable to  contemplate  Large  scale 
measures  at  world  Level.  The  IBRD  has  already  taken  action  in this  respect. 
The  increased opportunities which  the  planned  increase  in  capital  will 
give  the  Bank  and  the  International  Finance  Corporation  should  in part 
be  used  for  more  frequent  and  r~tional operations  in the  form  of direct 
participation or preferential  financing  for  investment,  particularly in 
the  mining  sector  (1). 
As  regards  a  more  direct  contribution  from  the  Community,  this  course  has 
already  been  adopted,  namely  when  the  ECSC  granted  loans  on  preferential. 
terms  for  iron  mining  projects.  The  European  Investment  Bank  can  also  take· 
action of this  kind  in  accordance  with  its Statute  (2).  It  may  be  appro-
priate  for  it to participate  in  some  of the  selected projects by  means  of 
financial  contribution to the  risk  capital,  loans or technical  assistance. 
Once  the principle is settled, more  detailed proposal-s--W1-L-l_.need  to  be 
framed  following .discussion with  the Member  Stai~s and  the  financial 
insitutions  concerhed. 
* 
*  * 
(1)  In  a  recent  IBRD  report  (concerned  ~ith the  setting-up  of  an 
Internation.al  Resources  Bank)  it is  recommended  that.  by  1980 
the  IBRD  and  the  IDA  double  the number  of  mining  and  energy  . 
projects  financed  by  them  to arrive at  a  Lodn  programme  totalling 
US  g  75D-850  milL ion.  The  regional' banks  and  the  IFC  should  also 
play1a greater  role  in the  financing  of mining  projects~ 
(2)  Article  18(1)  of  the  EIB's  Statute  enable~ it to  arant  loans out-
side  the. territory of  the  Community  upon  an  unan·i;·,1vus  Jecision of 
its Board  of  Governors. -13-
This  CotrJnission  communication is designed to  enable the  appropriate 
Gornrmui ty authorities to debate  the principle of the matter.  In the 
li3ht of"  ·t-he.  conclusions reached,  the  Commission will make  its proposals 
more  explicit,  on the basis of the guidelines that  emerge  from  the debate. 
In g-iving further  thought  to this matter,  as it will have  to  bef~re axzy 
final  specific proposal  can be  made,  the Commission will  consult business 
orgo.niz;ations  and national  agencies with  experience  in the matter,  whose 
assi:otance  will be  essential  for  the preparation and  implem~ntation of 
a  policy  .:>f  this kind.  In this connection,  the  ~·!ember States  should ask 
their authorities  and  agencies to help the  Commission  in any way  they can 
to finalize the proposed system. 
D,  CmTCLUSION 
* 
* * 
The  ur.certainty and  insecurity currently hanging  o~er ~uropean investments 
in maJ.;y  developing coUntries  impedes their efforts to develop their economies 
and  im;1rove  their purchasing powerG  As  a  result,  opportunities to  export 
capital  goods  from  the  Community  are cut  down.  TI1is  trend is damaging to 
the  economies  of both the developing countries  and  the industrialized 
countries.  In addition,  in the mining sector,  the drop  in European mining 
investments  :i..n  developing countries ultimately poses  a  threat to the 
Corninunit,y' s  supplies  of raw materials. 
Attempts  to  settle this problem at world level have  so  far been disappointing, 
and  there is no  sign that this state of affairs  can be  improved  in the near 
future. 
vfnerco.s  purely national  approaches  seem in most  cases to be  too  fragmentary, 
a  Co~~unity approach  would  enable the  Community's  economic  weight  and 
special relations with many  developing countries to be used to reach 
realistic  nnd  balanced solutions. 
The  Co~~ission accordingly requests the Council  to approve  the guidelines 
set out  above. 